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Abstract
We present a new group law defined on a subset of the projective plane
FP 2 over an arbitrary field F, which lends itself to applications in Public
Key Cryptography, in particular to a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement
protocol. We analyze the computational difficulty of solving the mathe-
matical problem underlying the proposed Abelian group law and we prove
that the security of our proposal is equivalent to the discrete logarithm
problem in the multiplicative group of the cubic extension of the finite
field considered. Finally, we present a variant of the proposed group law
but over the ring Z/pqZ, and explain how the security becomes enhanced,
though at the cost of a longer key length.
Keywords: Abelian group law, discrete logarithm problem, norm of an exten-
sion, projective cubic curve
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1 Introduction
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new group law, defined on the
complement of a projective cubic plane curve, prove its properties, and consider
the possibility of using it as a building block for cryptographic applications in
the field of Public Key Cryptography (PKC).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the group law and its
main characteristics and properties. In particular, we define the mathematical
problem associated to the considered group law, and we give the explicit for-
mulas to compute the group operation of any two elements of the group. These
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formulas, which involve coefficients from the base field, are applicable to any pair
of elements of the group with no exception whatsoever, which is advantageous
in view of possible cryptographic applications.
As an application of the defined group law to PKC, a cryptographic pro-
tocol, in particular, a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol, is defined in
section 3. We also analyze the computational difficulty of solving the mathemat-
ical problem underlying the defined group law, and we prove that the hardness
of our problem is equivalent to that of the discrete logarithm problem on the
multiplicative group of the cubic extension of the finite field considered.
In section 4 we consider an entirely analogous system, but shifting the general
base field to the ring Z/pqZ. We make it clear that this last proposal enhances
the security of the system, since it now depends not only on DLP but also on
the factorization problem, though at the price of doubling the key length.
Last section is devoted to the conclusions.
2 The group law defined
Let F be a field and let us consider a linear endomorphism A : V → V of the
vector space V = F3. We define the polynomial Q(x) = det(x1I+x2A+x3A
2),
where x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ V . The polynomial Q is homogeneous of degree 3, and
does not depend on A, but only on the characteristic polynomial χ(X) of A.
A new group law is proposed ⊕ : V × V → V . Let the multiplicative group
F∗ act on V by the diagonal action, i.e., λ ·(x1, x2, x3) = (λx1, λx2, λx3), and let
denote by FP 2 the projective plane, namely FP 2 = (V \ {(0, 0, 0)})/F∗. Then
the proposed group law induces an Abelian group law on FP 2 \Q−1(0).
If the characteristic polynomial χ(X) is irreducible in F[X ], thenQ−1(0) = ∅.
In this case, the group law extends to the whole set FP 2; moreover, if the base
field is a finite field Fq, with characteristic different from 2 or 3, then the group
G = (FqP
2,⊕) is proved to be cyclic.
The latter property permits us to apply the notion of discrete logarithm
to the group G. If we fix a generator g ∈ FqP 2, then any element h of the
group is the addition of g with itself a finite number of times, say n, so that
h = g ⊕ g ⊕
(n
· · · ⊕ g = [n]g. The number n is the logarithm of h to the base g.
Given any element h ∈ G, and a generator g of the group, the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP), consists in finding the smallest integer n, such that
h = [n]g. In this work, we prove that the DLP over G with a proper choice of
the generator is equivalent to the DLP over the multiplicative group (Fq3)
∗.
Popular current cryptosystems are based on the discrete logarithm problem
over different groups, such as the group of invertible elements in a finite field,
or the group of points of an elliptic curve with the addition of points as group
operation. Our proposal could fit perfectly well in the same niche.
As is the case for analogous public key protocols, the users of the present
proposal agree to a single base field Fq but each one of them is allowed to select
at will any (irreducible) polynomial
χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3, c1, c2, c3 ∈ Fq.
The public system parameters include the base field Fq, coefficients c1, c2, c3 ∈
Fq, and the generator g.
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Next we prove that the polynomial Q does not depend on A, but only on
the characteristic polynomial χ(X) of A.
Lemma 2.1. Let F be a field and let V be the vector space F3. If A : V → V
is a linear map such that the endomorphisms I, A,A2 are linearly independent,
then the homogeneous cubic polynomial Q(x) = det(x1I+x2A+x3A2) does not
depend on the matrix A but only on the coefficients c1, c2, c3 of its characteristic
polynomial χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3.
Proof. Let F¯ be the algebraic closure of F. As the endomorphisms I, A,A2 are
linearly independent, the annihilator polynomial of A coincides with χ(X) by
virtue of the Cayley-Hamilton theorem. Hence there exists a basis of F¯3 such
that the matrix of A in this basis equals one of the following three matrices:
(1)
M1 =

 α1 0 00 α2 0
0 0 α3

 , M2 =

 α1 0 00 α2 0
0 1 α2

 , M3 =

 α1 0 01 α1 0
0 1 α1

 ,
and from a simple calculation we obtain
Q(x) = det(x1I + x2Mi + x3(Mi)
2)(2)
= −c2x1(x2)
2 +
[
(c2)
2 − 2(c1c3)
]
x1(x3)
2 + c1(x1)
2x2
+
[
(c1)
2 + 2c2
]
(x1)
2x3 − (c2c3)x2(x3)
2 + (c1c3)(x2)
2x3
− (c1c2 + 3c3) x1x2x3 + (x1)
3 + c3(x2)
3 + (c3)
2(x3)
3,
for every i = 1, 2, 3.
Theorem 2.2. Every linear map A : V → V such that the endomorphisms
I, A,A2 are linearly independent, induces a law of composition
⊕ : V × V → V,
(x,y) 7→ z = x⊕ y,
by the following formula:
(3) z1I + z2A+ z3A
2 =
(
x1I + x2A+ x3A
2
) (
y1I + y2A+ y3A
2
)
,
where x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3).
Moreover, the set of elements x ∈ V such that x ⊕ y = (0, 0, 0) for some
element y in V \{(0, 0, 0)} coincides with the set Q−1(0), and ⊕ induces a group
law
⊕ : (F3 \Q−1(0))× (F3 \Q−1(0))→ (F3 \Q−1(0)).
If C denotes the projective cubic curve defined by Q(x) = 0, then the group law
⊕ also induces a group law
⊕ : (FP 2 \ C)× (FP 2 \ C)→ FP 2 \ C.
Proof. As A3 = c1A2 + c2A+ c3I, and
A2 · A2 = A ·A3
= (c1c3) I + (c1c2 + c3)A+
[
(c1)
2 + c2
]
A2,
3
from the formula in (3) it follows:
(4)
z1 = x1y1 + c3 (x2y3 + x3y2) + (c1c3)x3y3,
z2 = x1y2 + x2y1 + c2 (x2y3 + x3y2) + (c1c2 + c3)x3y3,
z3 = x2y2 + x1y3 + x3y1 + c1 (x2y3 + x3y2) +
(
(c1)
2 + c2
)
x3y3.
In matrix notation, these formulas can equivalently be written as
 z1z2
z3

 =

 x1 c3x3 c1c3x3 + c3x2x2 x1 + c2x3 c2x2 + c3x3 + c1c2x3
x3 x2 + c1x3 x1 + (c1)
2x3 + c1x2 + c2x3



 y1y2
y3

 ,
and as a simple computation shows, the determinant of the linear system above
is equal to Q(x), where Q is defined by the formula (2). Hence x⊕y = (0, 0, 0),
for some y in V \ {(0, 0, 0)}, if and only if Q(x) = 0.
The commutativity of ⊕ is a direct consequence of the invariance of the
formula (4) under the substitutions xi 7→ yi, yi 7→ xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Moreover, the formula (3) can also be written as follows:
(x⊕ y)1 I + (x⊕ y)2A+ (x⊕ y)3A
2 =(
x1I + x2A+ x3A
2
) (
y1I + y2A+ y3A
2
)
.
From the associativity of the composition law of endomorphisms we deduce
(x⊕ (y ⊕ z))1 I + (x⊕ (y ⊕ z))2A+ (x⊕ (y ⊕ z))3A
2
=
(
x1I + x2A+ x3A
2
)
·
((
y1I + y2A+ y3A
2
)
·
(
z1I + z2A+ z3A
2
))
=
((
x1I + x2A+ x3A
2
)
·
(
y1I + y2A+ y3A
2
))
·
(
z1I + z2A+ z3A
2
)
= ((x⊕ y)⊕ z)1 I + ((x⊕ y) ⊕ z)2A+ ((x⊕ y)⊕ z)3A
2.
Hence x⊕ (y ⊕ z) = (x ⊕ y)⊕ z, ∀x,y, z ∈ V .
From (4) it follows that the unit element is the point (1, 0, 0), which does
not belong to Q−1(0) since Q(1, 0, 0) = 1.
By taking determinants in the equation (3) we obtain
Q(x⊕ y) = Q(x)Q(y), ∀x,y ∈ V.
Therefore the opposite element y of x exists and it is given by the following
formulas:
y1 =
c1x1x2+[(c1)2+2c2]x1x3−(c3+c1c2)x2x3+(x1)2−c2(x2)2+[(c2)2−c1c3](x3)2
Q(x) ,
y2 = −
x1x2+(c1)
2x2x3+c1(x2)
2
−(c1c2+c3)(x3)
2
Q(x) ,
y3 =
−x1x3+c1x2x3+(x2)
2
−c2(x3)
2
Q(x) .
Finally, if x, y are replaced by λx, µy, respectively, with λ, µ ∈ F∗, then z
transforms into λµz, thus proving that the group law projects onto FP 2 \C.
Remark 2.3. Note that the equations in (4), allowing one to compute the ⊕
group operation in terms of the coefficients in the ground field, are applicable
to any element of the group, with no exception at all.
Remark 2.4. If v1 = (1, 0, 0), v2 = (0, 1, 0), v3 = (0, 0, 1), then from (2) we
obtain Q(v2) = c3, Q(v3) = (c3)
2. Hence v2 and v3 belong to F
3 \ Q−1(0) if
and only if c3 6= 0, i.e., when A is invertible.
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2.1 The basic cubic
Proposition 2.5. Let χ(X) = X3− c1X2− c2X− c3 ∈ F[X ] be the polynomial
introduced in Lemma 2.1 and let α = X mod χ. If N : F[α]→ F is the norm of
the extension F[α] of F, then a point β = β0 + β1α + β2α2 belongs to the cubic
curve C defined in Theorem 2.2 if and only if N(β) = 0. In particular, if χ is
irreducible in F[X ], then C has no point in FP 2.
Moreover, the polynomial χ is irreducible in F[X ] if and only if the cubic C
is irreducible.
Proof. Every β ∈ F[α] induces an F-linear endomorphism Eβ : F[α]→ F[α] given
by Eβ(ξ) = β · ξ, ∀ξ ∈ F[α], and from the very definition of the norm we have
N(β) = detEβ . As a computation shows, we obtain N(β) = Q(β0, β1, β2), thus
proving the first part of the statement. Moreover, χ is irreducible if and only
if F[α] is a field and then the norm is injective, thus proving the second part of
the statement.
Finally, if χ factors in F[X ], sayX3−c1X2−c2X−c3 = (X−h)(X2+kX+l),
with h, k, l ∈ F, then we have
Q(x) = [(x1)
2+(k2−2l)x1x3+l(x2)
2−klx2x3+l
2(x3)
2−kx1x2][x1+hx2+h
2x3].
Conversely, if χ is irreducible in F[X ], then according to Proposition 2.5,
the only solution to the cubic equation Q(x) = 0 is x = 0. Hence Q must
be irreducible, as a reducible cubic admits non-trivial solutions in the ground
field.
Corollary 2.6. If the characteristic polynomial χ of A is irreducible in F[X ],
then there is no linear transformation (λij)3i,j=1 ∈ GL(F, 3) reducing the poly-
nomial Q defined in (2) to Weierstrass form.
Proof. Replacing xj by Xj =
∑3
i=1 λijxi, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, in (2) we obtain a cubic
Q¯, which is in Weierstrass form (see [12, §2.1]) if and only if the coefficients
a, b, and c of the terms (x3)
3, (x1)
2x2, and x1(x2)
2, respectively, vanish. As
a computation shows, we have a = Q¯(λ31, λ32, λ33), and we can conclude by
applying Proposition 2.5.
2.2 Cyclicity
Theorem 2.7. If Fq is a finite field of characteristic different from 2 or 3 and
the polynomial χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3 introduced in Lemma 2.1 is
irreducible in Fq[X ], then the group G = (FqP 2,⊕) is cyclic.
Proof. Since charFq 6= 2, 3, the polynomial χ is separable and in its splitting
field F′q we have χ(X) = (X −α1)(X −α2)(X −α3), the roots α1, α2, α3 being
pairwise distinct, and in a certain basis of F′q ⊗Fq V the matrix of A is given by
the formula (1). As the Galois group G(F′q/Fq) acts transitively on the roots of
χ, there exist two automorphisms such that σ2(α1) = α2 and σ3(α1) = α3. If
β = β1+β2α1+β3(α1)
2, βi ∈ Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, is an element in Fq[α1] ∼= Fq3 , then
for every positive integer n we have
(
β1I + β2A+ β3A
2
)n
=

 β
n 0 0
0 σ2 (β
n) 0
0 0 σ3 (β
n)

 .
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Consequently, if β is a generator of the multiplicative group (Fq3)
∗, then the
vector (β1, β2, β3) generates the group ((Fq)
3 \{(0, 0, 0)},⊕) and its correspond-
ing projective point [β1, β2, β3] = (β1, β2, β3) mod F
∗
q generates the group G,
with FqP
2 =
(
(Fq)
3 \ {(0, 0, 0)}
)
/F∗q.
Remark 2.8. It is important to keep in mind that the implication in Theorem 2.7
works only in the way in which it is worded. If one selects a generator of the
group G, it will in general be a generator of only a subgroup of the whole (Fq3)
∗
group. Consequently, when choosing a generator for G, it is convenient to pick
it from the set of generators in (Fq3)
∗ and, after that, project it onto FqP 2.
Remark 2.9. As the order of the groupG = (FqP 2,⊕) is q2+q+1, the statement
of Theorem 2.7 means that there exists an element β ∈ G of order q2 + q + 1.
According to the proof of Theorem 2.7 this is equivalent to saying that the
matrix A in (1) is of order q2 + q + 1 in the linear group GL(Fq, 3). A classical
result (see [15, Theorem, p. 379]) states that such a collineation always exists,
but we need a direct proof of this fact to be able to apply it below in section 3.1;
also see [4, Proposition 2.1].
Remark 2.10. When the polynomial χ is reducible, experimental tests carried
out in the prime field Fp show that the projective cubic curve C defined as
Q(x) = 0 has a number of points from the set {p+ 2, 2p+ 1, 3p, p+ 1} only.
Since the projective space FpP
2 has a total of p2 + p + 1 points, the group
(FpP
2 \ C,⊕) is left, respectively, with {p2 − 1, p2 − p, (p− 1)2, p2} points.
If the number of points of C is either p + 2 or 2p + 1, then the group
(FpP
2 \C,⊕) is still cyclic, and has the expected number of generators, namely,
either ϕ(p2 − 1) or ϕ(p2 − p), respectively, where ϕ is Euler’s totient function.
However none of the other two possibilities give rise to a cyclic group.
Rather, for the case where C has 3p points, there appears a number of cyclic
groups, whose cardinalities are the divisors of p − 1; it is important to remark
that the total number of points left for the group is precisely (p−1)2. Thus, the
group (FpP
2 \ C,⊕) can be decomposed as a direct sum of a number of cyclic
groups such that the product of their cardinalities is (p− 1)2.
As for the case when C has p+1 points, the group (FpP
2 \C,⊕) is not cyclic
either and can be decomposed as a direct sum of 2 cyclic groups with p points
each. Remark that now the total number of points left for the group is p2, so
again the numbers of points of the cyclic groups of this case match the divisors
of p.
3 A cryptographic protocol
First of all, we establish the computational security of the mathematical problem
defined over the cyclic group considered. Later on, as an example of crypto-
graphical protocol, we present a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol.
3.1 Equivalence of DLP in G and (Fq3)
∗
Proposition 3.1. Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic 6= 2 or 3. Assume
the polynomial χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3 in Lemma 2.1 is irreducible in
Fq[X ], and let α ∈ Fq3 be a root of χ.
6
If (γ1, γ2, γ3) is a generator of the group ((Fq)3\{(0, 0, 0)},⊕) and (β1, β2, β3)
belongs to this group, then n ∈ N is a solution to the equation
(β1, β2, β3) = (γ1, γ2, γ3)⊕
(n. . .⊕ (γ1, γ2, γ3) ,
if and only if n is a solution to the equation β = γn in the multiplicative group
(Fq3)
∗, where β = β1 + β2α+ β3α2, and γ = γ1 + γ2α+ γ3α2.
Therefore, the DLP in the group ((Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕) is equivalent to the
DLP in (Fq3)
∗.
Proof. Letting α = α1, the statement follows from the matrix formula in the
proof of Theorem 2.7 taking the very definition of the group law ⊕ by the
formula (3) into account.
In the present case, Proposition 3.1 states the “equivalence” because the
reduction of problems (see, for example, [11, p. 5], [14, Ch. 8]) works both ways,
namely, DLP in the group ((Fq)
3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕) reduces to the DLP in (Fq3)
∗
and the other way around. Hence, Proposition 3.1 proves that the use of the
group G = (FqP
2,⊕) is safe for standard implementations in PKC (e.g., see [12,
§1.6]), since the security it provides is equivalent to that of DLP in (Fq3)
∗, as
long as the caveat stated in Remark 2.8 is taken into account.
In terms of cryptanalysis, in principle logarithms in G can be computed
using “generic” algorithms, i.e., those that assume no particular structure in
(or extra knowledge of) the group. The most popular ones are Pohlig-Hellman
(which reduces the computation in the whole group to the computation of the
logarithm in all subgroups of prime order of G), Shank’s Baby Step/Giant Step,
and Pollard’s Rho algorithm. All of them need an exponential computation
time.
However, there exists the so-called index-calculus algorithm, which is much
faster as it is able to compute discrete algorithm in the multiplicative group of
a finite field in subexponential time (see, e.g., [13]). Since the operations in the
proposed groupG = (FqP
2,⊕) can be efficiently transferred to those in (Fq3)
∗, it
follows that index-calculus algorithm can be applied to the multiplicative group
of the latter. This fact does not render the group operation automatically useless
in the face of possible cryptographic applications, as long as proper key lengths
are utilized.
For general finite fields, such as the proposed one, with a multiplicative group
of size N , current state-of-the-art algorithms (including index-calculus) report
computation times of
(5) LN(α, c) = exp
(
(c+ o(1))(logN)α(log logN)1−α
)
,
where α and c are parameters in the ranges 0 < α < 1 and c > 0 (sometimes c
is omitted and we default to LN(α)). Actually, α drives the transition from an
exponential-time algorithm (when α approaches 1) to a pure polynomial-time
algorithm (as α tends to 0).
The first subexponential algorithms had complexity LN (1/2) and applied
only to prime fields. Soon LN (1/3) was achieved for any finite field, with val-
ues for c ranging from (64/3)1/3 for fields with high characteristic to (128/9)1/3
for medium characteristic. When dealing with small characteristic fields, re-
cent research brought down the complexity to LN (1/4) ([9]) and even to quasi-
polynomial time ([2], [6]). If the group size is N = pn, and we write p = Lpn(lp),
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then the characteristic is considered “small”, “medium-sized” or “large” depend-
ing on whether lp ≤ 1/3, 1/3 < lp < 2/3, or lp ≥ 2/3, respectively.
In any case, the previous results have been applied in practice and several
cryptanalysis have been successfully carried out (see [1], [10]), so it seems sen-
sible to avoid using small characteristics and also extensions of moderate char-
acteristic included in the range threatened by recent cryptanalytic techniques
([2], [6], [7]). However these algorithms are heuristic and are proved to work
only for certain particular cases, not difficult to circumvent: for example, if one
has N = pn it suffices to choose both p and n to be prime in order to thwart
both [2] and [6]. For a detailed account of history and current status, see [8] (in
particular §4.2), and [5].
Our proposal is to use a group G of prime order n = q2+q+1, over a ground
field Fq. Using formula (5) we can compute how many elements in G provide
a given security level. Since the number of elements is roughly the square of
the value of q, it follows that q can be represented with only one half of the
bits needed for n. This has a direct impact on the computation time of the ⊕
operation in G, since it is performed in Fq (see equations (4) and cost analysis
in subsection 3.4).
3.2 System set-up and system parameters for a key agree-
ment protocol
The group G = (FqP
2,⊕) lends readily itself as a building block for standard
cryptographic applications to be constructed upon it. One of such applications
is a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol, which will be described in the
following sections.
In the following, we provide the necessary steps to set up the system. More-
over, the users also need to fix some system parameters.
System set-up
To set up the system, the following steps are in order:
1. Choose a ground field Fq with characteristic different from 2 or 3.
2. Select elements c1, c2, c3 ∈ Fq such that the polynomial
χ(X) = X3 − c1X
2 − c2X − c3
is irreducible in Fq[X ].
3. Consider Fq3 ≃ Fq[X ]/(χ(X)). Select α ∈ (Fq3)
∗ such that it is a generator
of (Fq3)
∗.
4. Compute the coordinates of α seen as a vector over Fq, which will be
denoted as (α1, α2, α3) ∈ (Fq)3 \ {0, 0, 0}.
5. Under the canonical projection π : (Fq)
3 \ {0, 0, 0} → FqP 2, compute
[β1, β2, β3] = π(α1, α2, α3).
System parameters
Following the previous notation, the system parameters are defined by the
set S = {Fq, [β1, β2, β3], c1, c2, c3}.
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3.3 The key agreement protocol
The key agreement follows the well-known Diffie-Hellman paradigm. Any two
users A,B, willing to agree on a common value, which remains secret, set up a
system and agree on its parameters, as stated previously.
The protocol runs as follows:
1. User A selects nA ∈ Zℓ, with ℓ = q2 + q + 1, computes
[γA1 , γ
A
2 , γ
A
3 ] = ⊕
nA [β1, β2, β3] ∈ FqP
2
and sends it to user B.
2. User B selects nB ∈ Zℓ, computes
[γB1 , γ
B
2 , γ
B
3 ] = ⊕
nB [β1, β2, β3] ∈ FqP
2
and sends it to user A.
3. User A computes kA = ⊕nA [γB1 , γ
B
2 , γ
B
3 ].
4. User B computes kB = ⊕nB [γA1 , γ
A
2 , γ
A
3 ].
According to the definitions, the following equalities clearly hold:
kA = ⊕
nA [γB1 , γ
B
2 , γ
B
3 ] = ⊕
nA (⊕nB [β1, β2, β3])
= ⊕nB (⊕nA [β1, β2, β3])
= ⊕nB [γA1 , γ
A
2 , γ
A
3 ] = kB.
Hence, the properties of the operation ⊕ in G ensure that actually kA = kB,
which is the common value expected as the output of the protocol.
3.4 Cost of the ⊕ operation in G
Let S and P be the number of field operations in order to perform an addition
and a multiplication respectively in Fq. From the formulas (4) it follows that
the total number of operations for computing x⊕y is equal to 10S+15P , once
the 2S + 3P precomputations of c1c3, c1c2 + c3, and (c1)
2 + c2 are assumed.
Additionally, two multiplications and one inversion are needed to eventually
project the resulting point back to FqP
2. However, in a typical setting their
cost can be neglected when compared with the relatively much larger number
of sums and products that are to be carried out.
3.5 A toy example
If we take the prime field Fp, with p = 131, it is case that p
2 + p+ 1 = 17293 is
also prime. Accordingly, the group G is cyclic. We set the parameters c1 = 13,
c2 = 18, c3 = 73, since the polynomial χ(X) = X
3 − 13X2 − 18X − 73 is
irreducible in F131.
Let us take the projective point X = [126, 16, 1] as a generator of G. If
we select now another projective point Y = [86, 120, 1], we find by exhaustive
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search the integer n such that Y = ⊕nX :
[126, 16, 1]→ [117, 130, 1]→ [11, 15, 1]→ [71, 56, 1]
→ [16, 98, 1]→ [72, 62, 1]→ [111, 125, 1]→ [110, 130, 1]
→ [130, 114, 1]→ [86, 120, 1].
Since the operation has been iterated ten times, we conclude Y = ⊕10X for
this particular pair, so that logX Y = 10.
4 A more robust system
The security of the cryptosystem proposed in the previous sections can be in-
creased by extending the theory developed for a field to the case of a unitary
commutative ring R.
In fact, let M be a free R-module of finite rank and let A : M → M be an
R-linear map with characteristic polynomial χA(X) = det(XI − Λ), X being
an indeterminate, I the identity matrix of order r = rankM , and Λ the matrix
of A in an arbitrary basis for M . According to [3, III, §8, 11.Proposition 20]
Cayley-Hamilton Theorem holds in this setting, namely χA(A) = 0.
Hence, if M = R3 and χA(X) = X
3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3, c1, c2, c3 ∈ R, then
A3 = c1A
2 + c2A+ c3I.
As above, we can define a degree-3 homogeneous polynomial in R[x1, x2, x3]
by setting Q(x1, x2, x3) = det
(
x1I + x2Λ + x3Λ
2
)
. As a computation shows,
we have
Q(x1, x2, x3) = −c2x1(x2)
2 +
[
(c2)
2 − 2(c1c3)
]
x1(x3)
2 + c1(x1)
2x2
+
[
(c1)
2 + 2c2
]
(x1)
2x3 − (c2c3)x2(x3)
2 + (c1c3)(x2)
2x3
− (c1c2 + 3c3) x1x2x3 + (x1)
3 + c3(x2)
3 + (c3)
2(x3)
3,
thus proving that Lemma 2.1 still holds in this case; i.e., Q depends on χA only,
but not on the matrix Λ.
The projective plane over R is then defined as follows: RP 2 = (R3\{0})/R∗,
where R∗ denotes the multiplicative group of invertible elements in R and R∗
acts on R3 \ {0} by
λ · (x1, x2, x3) = (λx1, λx2, λx3), ∀λ ∈ R∗, ∀(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 \ {0}.
Proceeding as in the previous sections, a composition law ⊕ : R3×R3 → R3,
(x,y) 7→ z = x ⊕ y, x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3), can be
defined by the formula
z1I + z2A+ z3A
2 =
(
x1I + x2A+ x3A
2
) (
y1I + y2A+ y3A
2
)
,
and similarly we deduce
(6)

 z1z2
z3

 =

 x1 c3x3 c1c3x3 + c3x2x2 x1 + c2x3 c2x2 + c3x3 + c1c2x3
x3 x2 + c1x3 x1 + (c1)
2x3 + c1x2 + c2x3



 y1y2
y3

 .
The determinant of the matrix of (6) is equal to Q(x1, x2, x3). Hence, ⊕
induces a composition law ⊕ : Q−1(R∗) × Q−1(R∗) → Q−1(R∗). If C denotes
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the set of classes modulo R∗ of points x ∈ R3 such that Q(x) ∈ R\R∗, then ⊕
also induces a composition law ⊕ : PQ−1(R∗)×PQ−1(R∗)→ PQ−1(R∗), where
PQ−1(R∗) = RP 2\C, as if Q(x) is invertible and λ ∈ R∗, then Q(λx) = λ3Q(x)
is also invertible.
The same proof given in the case of a field shows that the composition law ⊕
is associative, commutative and admits an identity element, which is the vector
(1, 0, 0).
Ifm = pq with p 6= q prime integers, then from Chinese Remainder Theorem
there is a ring isomorphism between Z/mZ and the product ring Fp×Fq. Hence
each vector x ∈ R3 can be assigned a pair (x′,x′′) in (Fp)3×(Fq)3 and the group
(Z/mZ)
∗
= (Fp)
∗ × (Fq)
∗ acts on R3 in the same way as (Fp)
∗ acts on (Fp)
3
and (Fq)
∗ does on (Fq)
3.
Consequently, x 6= 0 if and only if at least one of its two components x′,x′′
is distinct from 0, so that
(7)
R3 \ {0} =
[
{0} ×
(
(Fq)
3 \ {0}
)]
⊔
[(
(Fp)
3 \ {0}
)
× {0}
]
⊔[(
(Fp)
3 \ {0}
)
×
(
(Fq)
3 \ {0}
)]
.
Therefore (Z/pqZ)P 2 = FpP
2 ⊔ FqP
2 ⊔
(
FpP
2 × FqP
2
)
.
Moreover, letting z = (z′, z′′) = x⊕ y, as a computation shows, one obtains
z′ = x′ ⊕ y′ and z′′ = x′′ ⊕ y′′, and Q(x) is invertible if and only if Q(x)mod p
and Q(x)mod q both are invertible in Z/pZ and Z/qZ respectively. If x ∈ R3
corresponds to (x′,x′′) in (Fp)
3 × (Fq)3, then Q(x) = (Q′(x′), Q′′(x′′)), where
Q′(x′) = det
(
x′1I + x
′
2Λ
′ + x′3Λ
′2
)
, Q′′(x′′) = det
(
x′′1I + x
′′
2Λ
′′ + x′′3Λ
′′2
)
, and
Λ′ = Λmod p, Λ′′ = Λmod q. Hence
(8) Q−1(R∗) =
{
(x′,x′′) ∈ (Fp)
3 × (Fq)
3 : Q′(x′) 6= 0, Q′′(x′′) 6= 0
}
.
We set
χ′(X) = X3 − c′1X
2 − c′2X − c
′
3 ∈ Fp[X ], c
′
i = cimod p
χ′′(X) = X3 − c′′1X
2 − c′′2X − c
′′
3 ∈ Fq[X ], c
′′
i = cimod q
}
1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
If both χ′ and χ′′ are irreducible polynomials in Fp[X ] and Fq[X ], respec-
tively, then according to Proposition 2.5, the points of the associated curves C′
and C′′ reduce to the origin; i.e., Q′−1(0) = {0p}, Q′′−1(0) = {0q}, where 0p
and 0q denote the origin in (Fp)
3 and (Fq)
3, respectively.
From (7), taking (8) into account, it follows: PQ−1(R∗) = FpP
2 × FqP 2.
Consequently, we conclude that PQ−1(R∗) ∼= Sp ×Sq, where Sp and Sq are the
subgroups given by
Sp = (FpP
2 × {(1, 0, 0)},⊕), Sq = ({(1, 0, 0)} × FqP
2,⊕),
and from Theorem 2.7 we thus obtain
Proposition 4.1. If the polynomials χ′ and χ′′ are irreducible in Fp[X ] and
Fq[X ], respectively, then the group (PQ−1(R∗) = FpP 2×FqP 2,⊕) is isomorphic
to the direct product of the cyclic groups Sp and Sq. Hence (PQ−1(R∗),⊕) is
cyclic if and only if a = p2 + p + 1 and b = q2 + q + 1 are coprimes; i.e.,
gcd(a, b) = 1.
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Remark 4.2. If d = gcd(a, b), then a = da′, b = db′, with gcd(a′, b′) = 1. The
cyclic subgroup S in Z/aZ×Z/bZ spanned by (1mod a, 1mod b) is of order abd .
As d < pq and a = O(p2), b = O(q2), it follows: abd >
O(p2q2)
pq = O (pq), which
indicates that in general the group S is large enough, even if a and b are not
coprimes.
Remark 4.3. It is clear that the group (PQ−1(R∗),⊕) is also amenable a as
building block for a key-agreement protocol by choosing R = Zm, with m com-
posite. Observe that its security is enhanced with respect to its counterpart Fq,
q a prime power, since the algorithms known to be efficient to compute discrete
algorithms only work in the multiplicative group of a field. This means that one
is forced to factorize m in order to apply such algorithms to the present case,
thus increasing the time complexity and the security of the system, though at
the price of doubling the key length.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have defined a group law, ⊕, over the set FqP
2, and considered
the discrete logarithm problem associated to them. We have analyzed their
properties and stated the security of the problem considered. Moreover, based
on it, we have defined a cryptographic key agreement protocol as one possible
application of this problem to public key cryptography. Finally, we shift the
system to the group (PQ−1(R∗),⊕) over the ring Z/pqZ, which turns out to
be completely analogous to the previous one and offers an enhanced security,
though at the cost of some extra key length.
As future work, we think that it is possible to extend this discrete log-
arithm problem in order to define new cryptographic protocols for encryp-
tion/decryption and digital signatures, among others, in a similar way as El-
Gamal or elliptic curve cryptosystems were defined from the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol.
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